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ABSTRACT
Online reviews provide product evaluations for customers to make
decisions. Unfortunately, the evaluations can be manipulated us-
ing fake reviews (“spams”) by professional spammers, who have
learned increasingly insidious and powerful spamming strategies
by adapting to the deployed detectors. Spamming strategies are
hard to capture, as they can be varying quickly along time, different
across spammers and target products, and more critically, remained
unknown in most cases. Furthermore, most existing detectors focus
on detection accuracy, which is not well-aligned with the goal of
maintaining the trustworthiness of product evaluations. To address
the challenges, we formulate a minimax game where the spammers
and spam detectors compete with each other on their practical goals
that are not solely based on detection accuracy. Nash equilibria of
the game lead to stable detectors that are agnostic to any mixed
detection strategies. However, the game has no closed-form solu-
tion and is not differentiable to admit the typical gradient-based
algorithms. We turn the game into two dependent Markov Deci-
sion Processes (MDPs) to allow efficient stochastic optimization
based on multi-armed bandit and policy gradient. We experiment
on three large review datasets using various state-of-the-art spam-
ming and detection strategies and show that the optimization al-
gorithm can reliably find an equilibrial detector that can robustly
and effectively prevent spammers with any mixed spamming strate-
gies from attaining their practical goal. Our code is available at
https://github.com/YingtongDou/Nash-Detect.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Online reviews and ratings contributed by real customers help
shape reputations of the businesses and guide customer decision-
makings, playing an integrative role in e-commerce and websites
such as Amazon [8], Yelp [22], and Google Play [27]. However,
monetary incentives therein have also attracted a large number
of spammers to hold sway over less informed customers: it is esti-
mated that about 40% of the reviews on Amazon are fake (called
“review spams”) [34]. To cope with the spams and restore the trust-
worthiness of online reviews, many detection methods based on
texts [14, 25, 41], reviewer behaviors [17, 24, 42], and graphs [11, 15,
21, 28] have been proposed. See Table 1 for some state-of-the-art.
Table 1: Comparison of the proposed Nash-Detect and prior work. “Attack
Agnostic” indicates a method does not assume a fixed attack. “Practical Goal”
means at a business metric is considered.
Business Fraud Detection Proposed
Nash-Detect[18] [23] [47] [11] [44] [13] [3]
Practical Goal ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Attack Agnostic ✓ ✓ ✓
We note two drawbacks of existing detectors. 1)Most detectors
assume spams are generated by spammers1 with the same mindset
and can detect the spams by relying on the assumed spamming
strategy. In the real world, there are multiple groups of spammers
who have different goals, targets, resources, and strategies. One
spammer may want to promote a new business while another aims
to demote a popular brand’s competitors [23]. The wide spectrum
of detection signals published so far serves as strong evidence that
multiple spamming strategies co-exist and no single detector can
stop the spams. 2) Professional spammers are more persistent and
committed, and can research the latest detection techniques from
published papers [25], third-party detection websites with detailed
detection manuals [30], and labeled spams released by the review
website [28]. The spammer can integrate these resources and learn
to infiltrate the deployed detectors.
The above drawbacks are partially addressed by a diverse set of
spamming modes considered in the prior work [3, 5, 11, 13, 38, 43].
Nonetheless, the prior work aimed at high detection F1-score, AUC,
or top-k accuracy. Without considering practical spamming goals,
the accuracy-oriented detectors may not directly counteract the
unknown spamming goal. For example, as shown in Figure 1a, when
the human inspectors can only screen the most suspicious reviews
identified by the detector, one can achieve high top-k accuracy by
reporting k easy-to-catch but insignificant spams, while letting go
the more significant ones that are actually manipulating the review
1A “spammer” refers to a physical person or entity in the real world that spams, rather
than a “spamming account” that is set up by a spammer on the online review system.
∗This work was done when the author was at University of Illinois at Chicago.
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(a) Challenges and our methodology.
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(b) Practical effect vs. F1 Score
for different detectors.
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Figure 1: (a): A vulnerable spam detection pipeline, with steps numbered as (1), (2), etc. Accuracy-based detectors can bemisled to detect numerous insignificant
spams from new accounts, leaving behind themoremanipulative elite spams.We define a zero-sum game to find a robust defender against unknown and evolving
spamming strategiesA(p). (b): The practical effect vs. F1-score of individual detectors (shown in legend) against a mixed spamming strategy. The curve is obtained
by sweeping the detection thresholds. For most detectors, the attack could attain high practical effects even with high detection F1-scores. (c): For a fixed spam
detector (Fraudar), a spammer can choose the best out of five attack strategies to maximize the practical effect.
system [48]. In other words, the accuracy-oriented detectors and
the limited human screening resources create a unique vulnerability
in the spam detection pipeline.
We reconsider spam detection by posing the following questions.
1)What is the ultimate intention of the spammers? What is con-
sidered as a successful spamming campaign? From a marketing
perspective, a spammer aims to maximize reputation manipulations
and get paid by dishonest businesses. We distinguish the manipu-
lative effect by elite accounts from that by regular accounts, and
adopt marketing research results [18, 22] to formulate a practical
quantitative spamming goal. To show the vulnerability mentioned
above, we create spamming attacks against various state-of-the-art
spam detectors. The attacks effectively attain the practical spam-
ming goals while saturating the detectors to rather high detection
F1-scores (Figure 1b). 2)What if there are multiple evolving spam-
ming strategies? Our experiment results in Figure 1c show that a
single fixed detector will always fail to detect some spams when
a spammer has knowledge about the detector to carefully craft
evasive spams. This implies a black-box attack: if a fixed detector
is adopted, a spammer can probe the detection system by continu-
ously changing the spam generation strategy until success. Further,
if multiple spamming strategies co-exist, either because a spammer
diversifies its strategy portfolio, or because multiple spammers are
adopting different strategies simultaneously, likely, some strategies
will successfully infiltrate the fixed detector.
To answer the above questions, we propose Nash-Detect, an
attack-agnostic spam detector that is a Nash equilibrium of a mini-
max game and can tame adaptive and evolving spamming. 1)We
define practical goals for both spammers and detectors from the
business perspective. We calibrate the detector via a cost-sensitive
loss function focusing on practical spamming effect measured by
revenue manipulations rather than detection accuracy. By minimiz-
ing this loss function, the detector can be trained to go after a small
number of more manipulative spams, while letting go spams that
are less significant. 2) To reveal the vulnerability, we design strong
base spamming strategies against specific state-of-the-art detectors.
The base strategies will be combined into mixed strategies to ex-
plore even stronger attacks. Compared to neural network-based
attacks [32, 49], our spamming strategies rely on unlabeled data and
have no parameters to train. A spamming strategy based on param-
eter learning on a labeled set will be less general and can overfit the
training data. 3)We formulate a minimax game, where the spammer
will vary its mixed spamming strategies to maximize the practical
spamming effect, while the detector will reconfigure its detection
strategy to minimize the updated practical spamming effect. The
two strategies will hopefully evolve to an equilibrium consisting
of a robust detection strategy. To ensure computation tractability,
we propose a reinforcement learning approach to find an equilib-
rium of the minimax game in multiple episodes of fictitious plays
of the game. Each episode has two phases. In the inference phase,
the spammer samples a base spamming strategy according to the
current mixed strategy, and the detector runs its current detection
strategy. This step will evaluate the practical spamming effect under
the current two strategies. In the learning phase, we update the two
strategies by back-propagating the practical effect to the strategy
parameters, so that both players can move in opposite directions to
maximize and minimize the effect. After multiple rounds of ficti-
tious play, the converged detection strategy will be robust to any
spamming strategy, including the worst one that the spammer can
synthesize using the base spamming strategies.
Experiments show that Nash-Detect can find the best configura-
tions of detectors which always have better defending performance
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than the worst ones the spammer can synthesize. Nash-Detect also
exhibits great stability under various scenarios.
2 PRELIMINARIES AND CHALLENGES
The data of a review system can be represented by a bipartite
graph G consisting of a set of accounts U = {u1, . . . ,um }, a set
of productsV = {v1, . . . ,vn } wherem is the number of accounts
and n is the number of products, and a set of edges R = {ri j : i ∈
{1, . . . ,n}, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}}. Account ui posts a review to product
vj if and only if there is ri j ∈ R and we use R and ri j to denote the
set of reviews and a specific review. Nodevi (uj , edge ri j , resp.) can
have various attributes, represented by the vector xi (xj , xi j , resp.),
describing account and product profiles, and review metadata (e.g.,
posting time, ratings, and the related texts or image contents). The
review system evaluates a node v ∈ V with a reputation score
s(v), according to the product ratings, rankings, and credibility of
the review account . Users may rely on s(v) to decide whether to
commit trust, attention, and money tov . For example, elite accounts
have higher credibility and more likely to be trusted by users [8, 23].
A physical spammer is a person who registers and controls a set
of accounts (the “Sybils”)US = UE ∪UN ⊂ U [47], whereUE is
a set of elite accounts carrying more weights in their ratings, and
UN is a set of new accounts that the spammer register at any time.
When committing a spamming campaign, the spammer creates
a set of spams, represented as a set of new edges RS emitting
from some accounts in US towards the target nodes VT ⊂ V
and some non-targets V \ VT (for camouflaging) within a time
window. For simplicity, we assume the spams are posted towards
the target nodes only. The edges RS and the attributes of the edges
are decided by a spamming strategy with the goal of increasing
or decreasing s(v) for v ∈ VT . A spammer can adopt multiple
spamming strategies simultaneously. We assume there are K base
attack strategies a = [a1, . . . ,aK ] (specified in Section 3.4). Given
the current review system status and a spamming goal, a spamming
strategy decides when to use what accounts to post reviews with
what ratings to which targets. When multiple strategies are used
at the same time, the mixed attack strategy is denoted by A(p) =
Ek∼p[ak ] =
∑K
k=1(pkak ), where p = [p1, . . . ,pK ] is the mixture
parameter with
∑
pk = 1.2
No single detector can tackle all spamming strategies, and a
myriad of detectors based on different spamming assumptions have
been proposed in [1, 11, 25, 28, 42]. See the related work for more
details. Ensembling a diverse set of detectors has been proven
useful [28, 29]. We assume there is an array of L base detectors
d = [d1, . . . ,dL] and each detector outputs a number in [0, 1], with
a larger value denoting more suspiciousness. The detectors are
given various importance q = [q1, . . . ,qL], so that the detector in
effect is D(q) = ∑Ll=1(qldl ) = q⊤d.
Challenges and threat model. While the existing detectors are
designed to defend against one or multiple spamming strategies,
the underlying true spamming strategy has never been fully re-
vealed. To make the research problem tractable, we are not trying
to discover the true spamming strategy, but instead addressing the
strongest spamming strategy that the spammers can engineer given
2Rigorously, A(p) is not a weighted sum of numbers, since ak are not numbers but a
spam-generating function. Instead, think of A(p) as a weighted sum of functions.
due knowledge and resources [37]. This goal is more practically
meaningful: professional spammers can access the details of spam
detectors through published papers [25], reverse engineering from
labeled spams [28], and detection explanations [30], and update
their spamming strategies to evade a fixed detector. Indeed, pre-
vious work [5, 11, 31, 44] have considered spams in camouflage
for evading a fixed detector. Even if the fixed detector remains un-
known to the spammer, there are only a handful of salient detection
signals, leading to a relatively small space of detectors (all q over
the set of known salient detectors). A spammer can continue to
probe the current detector until it finds something vulnerable and
then crafts a strong spamming strategy.
The second challenge is that, spam detection is treated as a
binary classification problem and evaluated using accuracy [11],
recall [24], precision, AUC, or nDCG [28, 39]. These metrics are not
well aligned with the practical spamming goal, namely, to perturb
product reputation and revenue in a relatively short period. We
observed that the amount of perturbation is only weakly correlated
with the detection F1 score. See Figures 1b and 2. In reality, human
spam screening and removals are limited to the top-k suspicious
spams, and the revenue manipulation is not entirely due to the
number of missed spams (false negatives). We identify the follow-
ing vulnerability: massive obvious spams can easily be detected,
saturate the human screening capacity, and pose a deceivingly high
detection accuracy, while a small number of spams posted by elite
accounts are missed by the top-k screening and remain to manipu-
late the target reputation and revenue significantly [22]. We term
such detectors as “accuracy-focusing detectors”, as they optimize
accuracy and other related metrics (F1-score, recall rate, etc.)
3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 Turning Reviews into Business Revenues
A high (or low) rating will contribute to the growth (or decrease)
in the sales of a product [8, 23], and a one-star increase in average
rating contributes to a 5 to 9 percent increase in revenues [18, 22].
More specifically, the unit increase in revenue can be attributed to
two different types of reviews: those posted by regular accounts
(“regular reviews”) and those by elite accounts (“elite reviews”).
Different from the regular accounts, an elite account is recognized
by the review system if the account has frequently posted high-
quality reviews. The elite reviews are more influential in product
revenue [22], as they count more in product evaluation in the review
system and are more frequently presented to the customers than
the regular reviews.
Formally, let R (RE , resp.) be the set of all (elite, resp.) reviews
before a spamming attack, and let R(v) (RE (v), resp.) be the (elite,
resp.) reviews posted towards product v . We adopt the revenue
estimation function f (v;R) from [22] to measure the influence of
the reviews on the revenue of product v :
f (v ;R) = β0 × RI(v ;R) + β1 × ERI(v ;RE (v)) + α
= β0 × (д(R(v)) − д(R)) + β1 × д(RE (v)) + α , (1)
where the function д(·) computes the average rating from the given
set of reviews. RI(v;R) ≜ д(R(v)) − д(R) is the Review Influence
derived from how much the average rating of v is better or worse
than the overall average rating. ERI(v;RE (v)) ≜ д(RE (v)) is the
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Elite Review Influence due to the average rating contributed solely
by the elite reviews for v . β0 and β1 are coefficients of the two
influences, and α is the baseline revenue of all items3. Although
these coefficients are estimated using Yelp’s data and may not be
applicable to other review systems, the underpinning of the paper
can be applied to other systems such as Amazon so long as this
estimation can be done.
3.2 Practical Spamming and Detection Goals
While the spammers aim to manipulate (promote or demote) the
targets’ revenues, the spam detector aims to tame such manipu-
lations. In the following, assuming a spammer wants to promote
the given targets’ revenue, we define the goals of the spammer and
the defender (demotions are discussed at the end of Section 3). We
denote a spamming strategy by A(p) with parameters p, and the de-
tector with detection strategy q by D(q). The letter v is designated
to a target product.
A practical spamming goal. Let R(p) be the spams posted using
themixed spamming strategyA(p), andR(p, q) be the false-negative
spams that remain afterR(p) is purged by the detectorD(q) 4. Based
on the revenue f defined in Eq. (1), a metric to evaluate the Practical
Effect (PE) of spamming using A(p) on v against the detection of
D(q) is:
PE(v ;R, p, q) = f (v ;R(p, q)) − f (v ;R)
= β0 × ∆ RI(v) + β1 × ∆ ERI(v), (2)
which is the difference in the revenues of v after and before the
spamming and the detection.
∆ RI(v) = RI(v ;R(p, q)) − RI(v ;R) = д(R(v ; p, q)) − д(R(v))
∆ ERI(v) = ERI(v ;RE (p, q)) − ERI(v ;RE ) = д(RE (v ; p, q)) − д(RE (v))
are the change in influences due to the missed spams.
PE(v) can be negative when the spams and the detector bringv’s
rating down. This can happen when the human inspectors delete
some organic reviews with high ratings from v . We assume that
the inspectors will screen the top k (k is typically small) detected
reviews carefully so that there is no genuine review deleted. A drop
in revenue can also be caused by a spamming strategy that posts
negative reviews for ths camouflage purpose. We consider such
more complex strategies in future work.
Spamming goal: max
p
max{0, PE(v ;R, p, q))} (3)
A practical detection goal. The practical detection goal should
be minimizing max{0, PE(v ;R, p, q))} and make sure the resulting
detection strategy q will not entirely focus on detection accuracy
but will suppress the spamming promotion.
In the following, we define a back-propagation algorithm for de-
tection strategy learning. According to Eq. 2,max{0, PE(v ;R, p, q))}
summarized the effect of the false-negative spams R(p, q). To guide
the detection strategy q, we first back-propagate (or attribute)
3 β0 = 0.035, β1 = 0.036, and α = 1 based on the empirical findings in [22].
β1д(RE (v)) is much larger than β0(д(R(v))−д(R)) since β0 multiplies a difference.
4Possiblywith human screening of the detected reviews to further reduce false positives
max{0, PE(v ;R, p, q))} to individual false-negative spams, and the
attributed costs are further back-propagated to the current detec-
tion strategy q that lead to the false negatives. From the spammer’s
perspective, elite spamming reviews are more influential. From the
detector’s perspective, a missed elite spamming review leads to
a larger amount of revenue manipulation that a missed regular
spamming review. Based on cost-sensitive learning [7], we turn
the spamming effect max{0, PE(v ;R, p, q))} into detection costs ac-
cording to different detection outcomes: the detection costs of true
positives and true negatives are 0 (CTP = CTN = 0); the false posi-
tives will be handled by human screening and will cause zero effect
on the product revenue (CFP = 0); a false negative will not con-
tribute to the promotion of product v if PE(v) ≤ 0 unless otherwise
will contribute the following cost through ∆ RI(v) and ∆ ERI(v):
CFN(v, r ) = β0∆ RI(v)
Z1
+ 1r ∈RE (p,q)
[
β1∆ ERI(v)
Z2
]
, (4)
where Z1 and Z2 are respectively the amount of non-elite and elite
spams posted towards v . 1 is the indicator function. Based on the
analysis, the detection goal is defined as:
Detection goal:min
q
L(q) = 1|R(p, q)|
∑
r is FN
CFN(v, r ), (5)
where v is the target product that r was posted to.CFN(v, r ) implic-
itly depends on the strategy q, through the ranking of reviews by
the detector D(q) and the screening of the top k reviews. To facil-
itate the optimization of q, we define the following cost-sensitive
surrogate detection loss function:
Lq = 1|R(p, q)|
∑
r is FN
−CFN(v, r ) log P(y = 1|r ; q) (6)
where y ∈ {0, 1} is the label of r (y = 1 if and only if r is spam).
P(y = 1|r ; q) is the probability of r being a spam predicted by D(q):
P(y = 1|r ; q) = σ (q⊤d(r )), d(r ) = [d1(r ), . . . ,dL(r )]. (7)
where σ represents the sigmoid function, the surrogate loss says
to reduce the cost CFN(r ,v), the detector should output a large
P(y = 1|r ; q) so that the spam r can be pushed into the top k
suspicious reviews.
3.3 Minimax Game and Optimization
The spammer and the detector’s goals are now well-aligned: the
spammer aims at promoting the revenues of the targets v ∈ VT
and the detector wants to suppress such promotion. They will play
the following zero-sum game over the practical spamming effect
max{0, PE(v ;R, p, q))}:
min
q
max
p
∑
v ∈VT
max{0, PE(v ;R, p, q)}. (8)
Solving the above game will lead to a detector that can withstand
any mixing spamming strategies weights [a1, . . . ,aK ]. In particular,
we aim at a robust detector, parameterized by q∗, that will minimize
practical spamming effects caused by any spamming strategiesA(p).
One limitation of q∗ is that, during test time, a spammer may use
a pure strategy not considered in the pure strategies [a1, . . . ,aK ]
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that D(q∗) was trained on. It is thus essential to include represen-
tative spamming strategies during the training of q. Exhausting
all spamming strategies is out of the scope of this work, and in
Section 3.4, we specify evasive attacks against mainstream detec-
tors. In the sequel, “spammer” can refer to the fictitious spammers
during training or the real spammer during test time.
The objective function is not differentiable, as the calculation
of PE (shown in Eq. (2)) are based on nonlinear operators such
as adding reviews to R using the spamming strategy A(p), rank-
ing the reviews in R(p) based on P(y = 1|r ; q) (which depends on
the detectors [d1, . . . ,dL]), the removal of spams from the top k
suspicious ones, and the consideration of elite accounts. We note
that such non-differentiability is a necessary evil in robust spam
detection: diverse spamming and detection strategies help explore
the limit of both players, while many state-of-the-art spam attacks
and detectors are non-differentiable, non-continuous [44], stochas-
tic [11]. Therefore, gradient-based optimization methods are not
applicable, and we propose amulti-agent non-cooperative reinforce-
ment learning approach [12, 20, 35] and use stochastic optimization
based on Monte-Carlo to address the challenges. Regarding the
spammer and the detector as two competing agents who play the
attack and defense game in Eq. (8). The experiences of detector
and spammer will be obtained from a T -step roll-out of two de-
pendent Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) [33]: for each episode
(indexed by t = 1, . . . ,H ) of the H episodes of game playing, the
spammer will attack the review system using the current mixed
strategyA(p(t )) = ∑Kk=1(p(t )k ak ) and the detector will respond with
the mixed detection strategy D(q(t )) = ∑Ll=1(q(t )l dl ). Both mixing
parameters p and q will be updated as follows.
An MDP for the spammer. We adopt the multi-armed bandit
formulation [4] so that the spammer has no explicit state repre-
sentation of the review system but acts based on the practical
spamming effects. To be precise, the spammer maintains the distri-
bution p over the base spamming strategies a1, . . . ,aK as a policy.
In episode t , for each target v , the spammer samples an action ak
with k ∼ Multinominal(p(t )) to execute a spamming attack (via
posting a fake review to v using an account selected by ak ). The
attack on v by ak is denoted by ak ⇝ v . At the end of the episode,
the detector uses the mixed strategy D(q(t )) to remove some posted
spams, and the final PE(v;R, p(t ), q(t )) is calculated as in Eq. (2).
The reward for the spamming strategy ak is the portion of PE in
this episode due to the spams posted by ak but missed by D(q(t )).
The specific credit assignment at episode t is:
G(t )(ak ) =
∑
ak⇝v
σ
(
PE(v ;R, p(t ), q(t )) − AVG(PE)
Z
)
, (9)
whereZ = maxv ∈VT PE(v ;R, p(t ), q(t ))−minv ∈VT PE(v ;R, p(t ), q(t )).
Themaximum,minimum, and average are calculated over all targets
VT , including those not attacked by the strategy ak . The subtrac-
tion of the average from PE(v;R, p(t ), q(t )) can help differentiate
effective attacks from less effective ones [33]. The rewards are ac-
cumulated across multiple episodes of the game, and p(t ) is as:
p
(t+1)
k ∝ exp
(
η
t∑
τ=1
∑
ak⇝v
G(τ )(ak )
)
(10)
An MDP for the detector. In episode t , the detector senses the
state of the review system as the vector d(ri ) = [d1(ri ), . . . ,dL(ri )]
for each review ri ∈ R(p(t )) after the spamming attack A(p(t )).
To evaluate the current detection strategy, the labels of the added
spams are not disclosed to the detector when the detector D(q(t ))
takes its actions. To simplify training, the base detectors dl are
fixed. The strategy q(t ) generates the probability P(y = 1|r ; q) on
each review r ∈ R(p(t )) according to Eq. (7). The top-k suspicious
reviews based on P(y = 1|r , q(t )) are removed, leading to the set
R(p(t ), q(t )), which potentially contains false negatives that con-
tribute to PE(v;R, p(t ), q(t )). The spamming effect attributed to
individual false negatives is CFN defined in Eq. (4). The mixing pa-
rameter q(t ) will be updated to q(t+1) by minimizing the following
cost-sensitive loss function:
L(q) = 1|R(p(t ), q(t ))|
∑
r ∈R(p(t ),q(t ))
−CFN(v, r ) log P(y = 1|r ; q),
(11)
where v is the target that r was posted to. After the detection,
the current episode is done, and both agents move to the next
episode and play the same game with the updated parameters
(p(t+1), q(t+1)).
Optimization algorithm.We proposeNash-Detect in Algorithm 1
for finding a Nash equilibrium (p∗, q∗), and q∗ is the resulting robust
detection strategy. Figure 1a presents a toy-example of Nash-Detect.
At a Nash equilibrium, both the spammer and detector will not want
to change their strategies (p∗, q∗) since it will not lead to further
benefit. There can be multiple Nash equilibria and the algorithm
just finds one. It is challenging to prove the uniqueness of Nash equi-
libria except in some very restrictive problem settings. Experiments
show that Nash-Detect always finds a robust detector regardless
of what p∗ is. Nash-Detect is trained in H episodes. During each
episode t = 1, . . . ,H , there are the forward and backward steps:
• Inference (forward): for each target v ∈ VT , the fictitious spam-
mer samples one pure strategy from a1, . . . ,aK according to
p(t ) and posts spams to v using an account determined by the
selected strategy. The sampling of ak and the selection of ac-
counts by ak are conducted independently among the targets.
That is, posting spams to one target will not affect the selection
of ak and how ak runs its attack on the subsequent targets. It is
left as future work to consider updating the review data before
spamming the next target so there can be dependencies between
the spams towards two targets. When all targets receive their
spams, the detector D(q∗) removes the top-k suspicious spams
and the practical effect PE(v;R, p, q) is computed as the final
output of the inference (forward pass).
• Learning (backward): the current rewards for the spamming
strategies are calculated using Eq. (9) and p(t ) is updated to p(t+1).
Simultaneously, the detection strategy q(t ) is also updated by
minimizing the loss function Eq. (6) to obtain q(t+1).
Discussion. Nash-Detect assumes the spammer aims at promoting,
rather than demoting the targets. Nash-Detect can handle demotion
by changing the practical spamming effect frommax{0, PE(v ;R, p, q))}
tomin{0, PE(v ;R, p, q))}where PE(v ;R, p, q)) shall bemade a small
negative number to bring down the targets’ revenues.
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Algorithm 1 Nash-Detect: Training a Robust Spam Detector
1: Input: all reviews R, target itemsVT , pure attack strategies
[a1, . . . ,aK ], pure spam detectors [d1, . . . ,dL], initial spam-
ming strategy p = [p1, . . . ,pK ] and initial detection strategy
q = [q1, . . . ,qL].
2: Output: a Nash equilibrium (p∗, q∗).
3: repeat ▷ Go through the H episodes indexed by t
4: Inference:
5: R(p(t )) = R.
6: for all v ∈ VT do ▷ Post fake reviews
7: Sample ak using ϵ-greedy for v according to p(t ).
8: Post spams to v using ak .
9: Remove spams in the top k reviews detected by D(q(t )).
10: Compute PE(v,R, p(t ), q(t )) using Eq. (2) on R(p(t ), q(t )).
11: Learning:
12: Compute CFN(v, r ) using Eq. (4) and G(ak ) using Eq. (9).
13: Update p(t ) to p(t+1) using the gains G(ak ).
14: Update q(t ) to q(t+1) by minimizing Eq. (11).
15: until L(q) converges
When applying the resulting detector, admittedly, onemust know
whether a spammer will promote or demote a product. A sim-
ple solution is to learn about the probability that a product will
commit self-promotion and apply Nash-Detect trained based on
max{0, PE(v;R, p, q))}. For example, pieces of evidence showed
that when a product recently received negative reviews, it is more
likely to commit spamming for self-promotion. On the other hand,
demotions are more likely among competitors who offer similar
products (e.g., Samsung vs. Apple [36], or Starbucks vs. Dunkin’
Donuts [23]). We leave as future work regarding apply two robust
detectors to handle demotions and promotions simultaneously.
3.4 Base Detection and Spamming Strategies
Base detection strategies. As mentioned in Section 2, there have
been a variety of graph-based and behavior-based detectors. We
select the following five base detectors:
• GANG [39]: a social network Sybil detection algorithm via lin-
earized belief propagation.
• SpEagle [28]: an advanced belief propagation algorithm verified
on Yelp review spam datasets.
• fBox [31]: an SVD-based algorithm that spots small-scale suspi-
cious links in social networks.
• Fraudar [11]: a fraudster detection algorithm that detects dense
blocks in graphs.
• Prior: an algorithm that ranks spams based onmultiple suspicious
behavior features listed in [24, 25, 28].
These detectors are unsupervised [11, 28, 31], have no or very few
parameters [11, 24], are scalable [39], diverse, and representative
of explicit assumptions about the spamming strategies, making
the resulting detector more robust and interpretable. There is no
hurdle for Nash-Detect to include deep learning methods [14, 21]
as base detectors. However, the underlying spamming strategies
are learned from many labeled data, leading to a less interpretable
detector (in the sense of explaining the interplay between any two
Table 2: Dataset statistics and attack settings
Dataset
Dataset Statistics Attack Settings
|U | |V | |R | |UE | |VT | |R(p) |
YelpChi 38063 201 67395 100 30 450
YelpNYC 160225 923 359052 400 120 1800
YelpZip 260277 5044 608598 700 600 9000
detection and spamming strategies, and why the resulting detector
is robust).
Base spamming strategies. Different from the secure machine
learning literature [2], a spamming strategy cannot manipulate
some important detection features directly but has to do so via
posting new reviews. On some review systems, a spammer can
retract posted reviews and can be used in attacks against clustering
and classification on graphs [32, 49]. We assume that only additions
of reviews are allowed, similar to the attacks on graphs proposed
in [5]. The reasons are that adding reviews is the most direct way
to perturb target ratings, while deleting reviews can make a spam-
ming account look suspicious [30] and reduce the effects of previous
attacks. There are attacks based on text generation [15, 44] and con-
trol of spamming tempo [10], but we do not consider such controls
in this work for simplicity. All these prior attacks do not distinguish
elite and regular accounts and are not trained to maximize the prac-
tical spamming effect. We consider the situation where elite and
regular accounts contribute differently to the practical spamming
effect [42, 47]. We propose the following base spamming strategies
that differ in their target detectors and whether elite accounts are
employed, and let Nash-Detect learn the importance of each base
spamming strategy.
• IncBP: it uses elite accounts and tries to evade detectors that
use both behavior [24, 25, 42] and graph information [28, 39]. It
employs linearized belief propagation (LinBP) [39] on a Markov
Random Field (MRF) to estimate account suspiciousness. The
strategy estimates the suspiciousness of controlled accounts after
posting fake reviews to one target and posts reviews to the next
target using accounts with the minimum suspiciousness.
• IncDS: it uses elite accounts and aims to evade detectors that
regard dense blocks suspicious [11]. IncDS estimates the sus-
piciousness of each account using the density of the subgraph
composed of its neighbors after a spam is posted. IncDS selects
the account with minimum density to post the next spam.
• IncPR: it uses elite accounts and aims to evade the detector Prior.
The spamming process is iterative with account suspiciousness
estimation, similar to IncBP and IncDS.
• Random [11, 31]: it randomly picks an elite account to post a spam.
• Singleton: it uses new accounts, each of which posts only one
review. Such spams can avoid creating dense blocks and thus can
evade Fraudar.
4 EXPERIMENTS
4.1 Experimental Setup
Datasets.We conduct experiments on three Yelp review datasets
(YelpChi, YelpNYC, and YelpZip) tested in [25, 28]. The datasets
contain filtered (spam) and recommended (legitimate) reviews on
Yelp, although we use no label information therein but pretend the
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set of reviews are R, from which the spammer will start spamming
attacks. Table 2 shows the dataset statistics.
Elite account selection. Though we can obtain the elite status of
accounts from the Yelp website, the above datasets only contain
partial reviews from each account, which could not reflect the actual
influence of elite accounts. Since Yelp takes the account’s review
amount as a crucial factor of its elite status, and there are estimated
6% − 9% elite members among all accounts of Yelp [6, 16, 46], we
regard accounts with more than ten reviews as elite accounts in
experiments, representing 1.4%, 4.30% and 4% of the total accounts
on the three datasets, respectively.
Attack setting.Under YelpChi, for non-singleton attacks, the spam-
mer controls the same set of elite accounts with the same targets.
Among the legitimate elite accounts, we select a fixed set of 100
accounts with minimum suspicious scores obtained by Prior as the
controlled elite accounts. In this way, we can guarantee that an elite
account has a small suspicious prior and will always maintain its
elite status during the spamming campaign. We create 450 new ac-
counts for the Singleton attack. Based on the item features in [28],
we select 30 items with the lowest suspicious scores as the target
items. We post fake five-star reviews in one day for promotion
purposes. The attack settings for YelpNYC and YelpZip are set up
similarly with scaled amounts (see Table 2 for details).
Detector setting. Each detector runs independently on all reviews
and reports review suspicious scores. The suspicious score of a
review is computed via Eq. (7). All reviews are ranked by their
suspicious scores in descending order, and we only remove spams
among top k%. We set k = 1 in our experiment.
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Figure 2: Practical Effect vs. F1 Score for different detectors against ensem-
ble attacks on YelpNYC and YelpZip.
4.2 Practical Effect vs. Accuracy.
To verify the advantage of the proposed practical goal, we plot the
detection results of five single detectors against five attacks under
three datasets. Figure 1b and Figure 2 show the Practical Effect-F1
Score curves of five detectors against multiple attacks on three
Yelp datasets. The practical effect is calculated according to Eq. (2),
F1 score is obtained by the suspicious score ranking of a detector.
Given a review suspicious score ranking, when we decrease the
classification threshold from 100% to 0%, more fake reviews will
be detected, the F1 score increase from 0 to 1, and the practical
effect should gradually decrease. However, most detectors (GANG,
fBox, SpEagle, Prior) only reduce a small practical effect of attacks
when their F1 scores increase from 0 to 0.8. It demonstrates that the
practical goal proposed by us could capture the practical effect of the
spamming campaign, and a high accuracy metric does not mean a
good practical detection performance. We also employ the practical
effect to show the vulnerability of individual detectors. Table 3
shows the practical effect of individual detectors against individual
attacks.We can see that, if the spammer handles multiple spamming
strategies, for detectors like Fraudar and fBox, it could switch to
the strategy that harvests the most practical effect. Therefore, a
detector ensemble configuration D(q) is necessary.
Table 3: The practical effect of detectors against attacks under YelpChi.
GANG SpEagle fBox Fraudar Prior
IncBP 4.8916 4.9052 4.9125 1.4203 4.9099
IncDS 4.9010 4.9052 4.9110 4.8959 4.9099
IncPR 4.9010 4.9052 4.9105 3.0716 4.9099
Random 4.9010 4.9052 4.9092 4.8962 4.9099
Singleton 0.5300 0.5865 0.5783 0.5771 0.5912
4.3 Nash-Detect Training Process
Evaluation criteria.According to Section 3.3, we expect that Nash-
Detect can find the optimal detector configuration (q∗) by playing
the minimax game between the spammer and defender. With the q∗,
the performance of any attack should be worse than the worst-case
performance of every single attack against a single detector [37]. It
will show that the detectors configured by Nash-Detect could de-
fend the attacks better than any single detectors. The performance
of attacks and defenses are both measured by the practical effect
(Eq. (2)). We run Nash-Detect for 50 episodes on three datasets, and
the results are shown in Figure 3.
Spamming strategy updating. Figure 3a shows the updating pro-
cess of spamming strategy mixture parameter (p). We can see that
Nash-Detect successfully identifies that reviews posted by new ac-
counts (Singleton attack) are not a big deal. A similar observation
is shown in Table 3 where the Singleton attack’s practical effect
is much smaller than the other attacks among all detectors. This
observation is consistent with the practical influence of non-elite
accounts discussed in Section 3.2. In Figure 3a, the spammer finds it
hard to evade the defense strategy, demonstrated by the continuous
evolution of the attacking mixture distribution p.
Detector importance updating From Figures 3a and 3b, we can
see that no matter how the spamming strategy evolves, the detec-
tion configuration and performance are stable, and the detector
importance updates toward the optimal configuration. Meanwhile,
the loss of detectors (Eq. (11)) converges as training episodes in-
creases (Figure 3f). In Figure 3b, though the ordering of GANG
and Fraudar based on their importance (q) differ between YelpChi
and other two datasets, they both perform better than worst cases
of individual attack/defense under each dataset. It means that the
proposed learning algorithm could adjust itself to find the optimal
configuration of detectors.
Practical Effect. According to Figures 3b and 3d, the learned de-
tector importance (q) do not use a single detector but with a stable
distribution that guarantees the worst-case performance is better
than the worst-case when using a single detector (dash lines at the
top). Comparing Figure 3d and Figure 3c, we find that the number
of missed spams has very little to do with the practical spamming
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Figure 3: The training process of Nash-Detect with 50 episodes.
goal, as the practical effect of multiple attacks against the detec-
tor ensemble will always be lower than the worst cases of single
attack/defense.
5 RELATEDWORK
SpamDetection Algorithms Besides text-based detectors [14, 25,
28, 41], there are three major types of spam detectors. Behavior-
based detectors [24, 25, 28, 42] calculate review suspicious scores
based on different behavior features.
Some graph-based detectors adopt representation learning ap-
proaches, such as SVD [31], node2vec [15], and more recently graph
neural networks [21]. fBox [31] assumes spamming accounts are
outliers of the review graph and cannot be reconstructed from the
top eigenvectors. Some graph-based detectors spot dense blocks [11]
or flows [19]. For instance, Fraudar [11] assumes spams originated
from the same physical spammer are likely to be posted by the same
set of accounts towards similar targets, leading to dense blocks of
the spamming accounts and the targets on the review graph.
The last type of detector utilizes both behavioral and graph
structural information [28, 39]. In [28], an MRF is used to model
the review graph, with accounts, reviews, and products as random
variables. CDF of each behavior feature is estimated, and normal-
ized suspiciousness scores are calculated based on the CDF. The
random variables are then assigned a prior distribution by aggre-
gating the suspiciousness scores based on multiple features. LBP
then calculates the posterior distributions of the nodes by passing
messages among the random variables. In [40], they used a similar
graph, but the message passing is controlled by three equations for
calculating node suspiciousness. GANG [39] leverages the infor-
mation of directed edges in online social networks to detect Sybil
accounts. Linearized belief propagation (LinBP) [9] is used to infer
node posterior beliefs, which is more efficient than LBP.
Marketing Research on Spam Campaigns. Online review sys-
tems and the associated spam campaigns have drawn much at-
tention from researchers in marketing. [8, 22, 45] study how on-
line business ratings influence consumers’ purchase decisions. [45]
shows that a ten percent increase in traveler review ratings will
boost online bookings by more than five percent. [8] suggests that
both the reviews and the accounts’ social status will contribute to
revenue growth. Inspired by the above works, we propose to in-
corporate economic incentives and accounts’ social status into the
spamming practical goal. In the real world business system, there
are factors like business operation status and business category that
may affect the business revenue. However, it is infeasible for us to
model such a complicated relationship using only the online review
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data. Therefore, we mainly focus on the relationship between rating
and revenue.
6 CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose a practical metric for review systems with
product revenue promotion in mind. We investigate the practical
performance of mainstream spam detectors against several goal-
oriented spamming attacks in an adversarial setting. We formulate
a game theoretical model and reinforcement learning algorithm to
find a robust detection strategy against a diverse set of spamming
strategies. Empirical evaluations on three large review datasets
demonstrate that the proposed algorithm can indeed generate de-
tectors that can effectively tame the practical spamming goal of
product revenue manipulation. It remains our future work to adopt
the proposed model and algorithms to adversarial misinformation
attack in other reputation systems, such as rumor detection on
social networks.
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A SUPPLEMENT
A.1 Implementation Notes
A.1.1 Software and Hardware Configurations. All algorithms are
implemented in Python 3.7.3 with standard scientific computation
packages. All codes are executed on a 3.50GHz Intel Core i5 Linux
desktop with 64GB RAM.
A.1.2 Dataset Preprocessing Details. We exclude all the labeled
spammers and their reviews in the original datasets to avoid bi-
ases during the evaluation. The fake reviews posted by attacks are
regarded as positive (spam) instances, and all other reviews are
negative (legitimate) instances.
A.1.3 Detector Implementation Details.
• GANG [39]: since the original algorithm only calculated the
posterior belief of user nodes. We calculate the suspicious score
of review r using the equation below:
sr =
su + pr
2 (12)
where the su is the posterior belief of the account which posts
review r ; and pr is the prior belief of review r . we reproduce the
C++ code from authors in Python.
• SpEagle [28]: we reproduce the original MatLab code in Python.
• fBox [31]: the original fBox algorithm only outputs a list of
detected suspicious nodes. We take the prior belief of reviews
posted by detected accounts as review suspicious score and set
the suspicious score of other reviews to be zero. We use the
Python source code provided by authors. Two parameters of the
model are τ = 20%,k = 50. τ is optimized from a search space
[1%, 5%, 10%, 20%, 50%, 99%] and k is the original value used in
the paper[31].
• Fraudar [11]: we use the Python source code provided by authors.
Fraudar is running under the detect_blocks mode, where all re-
views will be assigned to dense blocks, the output of Fraudar
are dense blocks and their corresponding density scores. Similar
to fBox, Fraudar only outputs the density score of accounts. We
take the density score of an account as the suspicious score of its
reviews.
• Prior: we implement the algorithm in Python. Review suspicious
score is computed via the aggregation function introduced in [28]:
Su = 1 −
√∑H
l=1 h
(
x2u
)
H
, (13)
where {x1, . . . ,xHu } is a set of H behavioral feature values of
account u. The suspicious score of u is aggregated through a
feature transformation function h in [28].
For SpEagle and GANG, we use the same parameter setting re-
ported in their papers, and our Python codes have similar detection
performances comparing to the original codes.
A.1.4 Attack Implementation Details.
• IncBP. IncBP estimates the suspiciousness of controlled elite
accounts using Linearized Belief Propagation (LinBP) proposed
by [39]. LinBP is an improved loopy belief propagation [26] algo-
rithm on Markov Random Field (MRF) with less time complexity.
In this work, the MRF is composed of account nodes and prod-
uct nodes, the reviews between them are edges. For each target,
IncBP runs LinBP first and selects the accounts with minimum
suspicious scores to post fake reviews. Then it updates the entire
graph with injected reviews, reruns LinBP, and attacks the next
target iteratively.
• IncDS. For each target, IncDS first uses all controlled elite ac-
counts to post fake reviews to the target on an auxiliary graph; it
then calculates each controlled account’s density on the auxiliary
graph. The density of an account u is:
d(u) = |R(u)|∑
ruv ∈R |R(v)|
. (14)
It is the division between the degree of u and the degree of all
products reviewed by u. IncDS selects the accounts with the min-
imum densities to execute the real fake review injection for the
current target. Such a mechanism guarantees the spammer avoid-
ing formulating dense blocks around the controlled accounts
during the spamming attack.
• IncPR. IncPR does not rely on graph information of the review
system. It first calculates the suspicious score of each controlled
elite account using Prior. Then it selects the accounts with the
minimum prior suspiciousness to add fake reviews.
A.2 More Experiment Results
Top k . Figure 4a shows the practical effect change under different
detection filtering thresholds. As the filtering threshold increases,
the attacks become harder to reach their practical goals; thus the
practical effects of them become lower. Under Top 10% and Top
15%, the practical effect will come below zero at some episodes.
The reason is that the removed reviews bias the overall revenue
estimation of all products and thus influence the target product’s
revenue. This effect can be studied in the future work.
Elite account threshold. In Section 4.1, we set #review ≥ 10 as
the elite account selection threshold. Figure 4b presents the ex-
periment results on more thresholds, where 5, 4, and 3 select top
5.7%, 8.5%, 14% accounts with most reviews. We can see that at-
tack could reach the best practical effect with ten as the threshold.
The reason is that, under a greater elite account selection thresh-
old, the spammer controls a greater proportion of elite accounts
among all accounts. Thus, those controlled elite accounts have more
significant impact on the practical effect.
Demotion attack. Previous experiments focus on the promotion
spamming attack because it is more prevalent. According to [22],
the demoting spamming attacks usually appear between competi-
tors. We change our attacks to demoting attacks by modifying the
rating of posted reviews from five stars to one star. Figure 4c shows
the practical effect of demoting attacks on YelpChi. Note that the
practical effect (Eq. (2)) is negative for the demoting spam campaign.
Without changing the initial configuration, the proposed algorithm
can still minimize the negative influence of demoting attacks, which
is always less than the worst case.
Spammer’s behavior. In real-world spamming campaigns, since
most of the merchants soliciting fake reviews aim to meet the spam-
ming goal as fast as possible [25, 42], spammers must finish fake
Robust Detection of Adaptive Spammers by Nash Reinforcement Learning KDD ’20, August 23–27, 2020, Virtual Event, USA
0 10 20 30 40 50
Episode
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
Pr
ac
tic
al
 E
ffe
ct
Worst Case k=1 k=5 k=10 k=15
(a) Top k% sensitivity.
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(c) Demoting attack.
Figure 4: The practical effect of (a) different top k% thresholds; (b) different elite account selection thresholds; (c) demoting
attacks under Yelpchi.
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Figure 6: The practical effect of Nash-Detect vs. the worst
case of games with less detectors and attacks under YelpChi.
The title of each sub-figure represents the removed detec-
tor/attack.
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Figure 5: The game outcome under different behavior cam-
ouflage levels.
review injection tasks within a limited period. However, fruitful
features and algorithms have been proposed to capture the bursti-
ness (or spikes) of review activities to spot spam campaigns [28, 47].
Correspondingly, strategic spammers may carefully adjust the post-
ing frequency to avoid traffic spikes [13]. Besides that, spammers
could smooth out their reviews with moderate ratings (i.e., two or
four stars out of five) to evade the detection [27].
To study the sensitivity of our algorithm on different behaviors
of the spammer under promotion attack, we take the same setting
in previous experiments, where all 5-star fake reviews are posted
in one day, as aWeak Level Attack. Then we propose the Medium
Level Attack: fake reviews are posted in five days, and their ratings
are randomly sampled from four to five stars. The Strong Level
Attack is where fake reviews are posted within fifteen days. Review
ratings are selected in the same way as the Medium Level Attack.
Figure 5 shows that no matter how spammer switch adjust their
behavior, Nash-Detect can make the practical effect always less
than the worst case.
Sensitivity on the base detector and attack amounts. Each sub-
figure in Figure 6 shows the practical effect of the game when one
detector/attack is removed (figure title indicates the removed one).
We could see that our algorithm still performs better than the worst
case with any four attacks/detectors. The second row of Figure 6
shows that the first four attacks with controlled elite accounts have
similar performance, and the Singleton’s plot indicates that the
spammer could get a better practical effect only using elite accounts.
